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Contracting for the unknown and the logic of innovation 
Abstract 
This paper discusses the components of contracts adequate for governing innovation, and their 
microfoundations in the logic of innovative decision processes. Drawing on models of discovery 
and design processes, distinctive logical features of innovative decision making are specified and 
connected to features of contracts that can sustain innovation processes and do not fail under 
radical uncertainty. It is argued that if new knowledge is to be generated under uncertainty and 
risk, ‘relational contracts’, as usually intended, are not enough and a more robust type of 
contracting is needed and it is actually often used: formal constitutional contracts that associate 
resources, leave their uses rationally unspecified, but exhaustively specify the assignment of 
residual decision rights and other property rights, and the decision rules to be followed in 
governance.  The argument is supported by an analysis of a large international database on the 
governance of multi-party projects in discovery-intensive and design-intensive industries. 
Keywords:  Contracts, Innovation, Design, Discovery 
 
Introduction 
A widespread tenet in organization, management and economics is that strong uncertainty puts 
both rational behavior and contractual governance under strain. The roots of that thesis lie in the 
bounded rationality argument that, in the face of growing uncertainty, decision making 
increasingly deviates from the classic complete knowledge, utility maximizing approach. Actors 
proceed with limited knowledge, rely on simplifying heuristics and take decision-making 
shortcuts. In contract theory, especially where bounded rationality is admitted, as in the most 
important strands of transaction cost economics and property right theory, it is generally 
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contended that as uncertainty grows, limitations in foresight render contracts more and more 
incomplete, in the sense that an increasing variety of matters are left unspecified (Williamson, 
1975; Hart, 1988). The mechanisms that intervene to take care of those unspecified matters are 
often thought to be mainly ‘extra-contractual’ (Macaulay, 1963) and mainly informal: for 
example, self-enforcing mechanisms based on common interest – what economists mean by 
‘relational contracts’ (Backer et al., 2002); and social embeddedness in commonly accepted 
norms – a view of relational contracts that is common in management (Ring and Van de Ven, 
1992; Poppo and Zenger, 2002).  
Both the above traditions in decision making and contract theory face important anomalies 
though, especially when action projects aim at innovation - that, in fact, is not prominently 
considered in those works. For instance, how can the innovation rate be as high as it is, if 
decision-making under uncertainty is shaped by local search and ‘simple heuristics’ (Grandori, 
2010a)?  How does it come that different parties frequently enter into collaborative agreements 
for innovative ventures, often underpinned by rather ‘simple’ contracts (Al-Najjar, 1995)? Is it 
simply because poorly observable cultural, informal or social relations blend in to support 
governance (Gilson et al., 2010)? How can this type of relational agreements provide sufficient 
shelter for investing significant human, technical and financial capital in risky projects? These 
puzzling questions invite some rethinking of the cognitive and contractual foundations of 
innovation. 
The rethinking proposed in this paper contends that when innovation is important, more 
ambitious responses to uncertainty are worthwhile, possible and even common. They can be 
identified by revisiting innovation studies in various fields, looking for answers to disconfirming 
questions such as: Is it really the case that the best that humans can do in the face of uncertainty 
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is to ‘avoid’ or reduce it? Is it really the case that there is no effective form of contracting ‘in the 
face of the unknown’? Is it really the case that ‘the management of innovation’ can only be 
flexible if it is largely informal?  
The conceptual part of this paper addresses those questions, by identifying some key features 
of innovative decision processes; and enquiring into the features of agreements among different 
actors that may allow, and possibly support, the unfolding of those processes.  The main idea is 
that between incomplete contracts among boundedly rational actors on one side and complete 
contingent contracts among omniscient actors on the other side, there is something else, and 
probably the most interesting things.  
Consider for example what is and what is not specified in the following agreement for 
innovation, entered into in 2003 by Aspreva Pharmaceuticals S.A. of Switzerland, and the U.S. 
prescription drug unit of Hoffmann-La Roche (“Roche”), and intended to last until 2017. The 
object of the agreement was the development and commercialization of a certain drug, already 
approved for the prevention of organ rejection, as a treatment of possible additional indications. 
The contract incorporated the traditional “boilerplate” (i.e. standard) clauses, such as limitations 
on liability, indemnifications, and force majeure, to deal with those risks that are recurring across 
all contractual relationships. The most important and specific set of clauses regarded royalties, as 
they were the main form of payment. The agreement designed them so as to bring about a 
substantial sharing of risk. Beyond those basic standard ingredients, the interesting feature of 
such an agreement is that it specifies many things except what precisely will be done or 
delivered. The agreement dedicated no more than a couple of lines to detailing the object, which 
was in fact partially unknown at the outset. Instead, the agreement was very extensive (a hundred 
pages) on a few issues, illustrated in the next points.   
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- A sizeable section of the agreement regulated drug development and the subsequent 
commercialization activities. For this purpose, the agreement referred to the ‘plans’ 
attached to it, but recognizing that they were to be intended as a ‘high-level outline’.  
Interestingly, these sections explicitly recognized the fallibility of judgment under 
uncertainty, and held that the parties would not be deemed to be in breach of the contract 
if they failed to meet the drug development goals of the collaboration.  
- Rather than on the content of goals and results, the contract concentrated a lot on the 
ruling bodies and the decision making procedures. These procedures were relatively short 
as to the relational norms to be followed, such as that the parties promptly disclose 
information, provide reasonable assistance to each other, and use commercially reasonable 
effort. Instead, substantial space was dedicated to contractual terms that established an 
association among the entities and a joint governance body, and specified the parties’ 
decision and exit rights, exemplified in the next points.   
- The parties had right to access each other’s patents and know-how for the purpose of the 
collaboration, and obligations not to perform any activity with the same technology and 
for the same purpose outside the focal collaboration. In the case of unilateral withdrawal 
of one party, the non-terminating party would continue to enjoy access to the technology 
for the purposes of the agreement. The association  was also granted the right to access for 
the same purposes every invention that would occur during the term of the collaboration. 
- The steering of the association was assigned to a  Joint Committee, and to subcommittees 
that this would institute. The parties would have equal representation in the Joint 
Committee, and this organ would decide on a wide array of matters, in every case by 
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unanimous consent. This stipulation, coupled with a set of checks and balances, entailed 
that no material issue would be decided unilaterally.   
- The parties waived the right to determine disputes through court litigation. As a result, far 
from minimizing the need for ex-post negotiation, the agreement institutionalized joint 
decision making and negotiation as the main mechanisms for making important decisions. 
In case of disagreement, the ‘court of last resort’ was indicated in a jointly appointed 
arbitrator.  
What this contract formally specifies then, in quite an exhaustive manner, are the reciprocal 
rights and obligations of the parties, what they commit and own, how they are going to decide 
what to do.  Such a contractual profile is rather common in innovation. As Lerner and Merges 
(1998) observed in a valuable footnote to their analysis of the content of a large sample of 
biotechnology alliance agreements, rather than trying to spell out “a myriad of possible world-
states, and dictating outcomes under each of many scenarios” these contracts focus on “discrete 
aspects of the fundamental ownership right over the research results”. 
Why is such form of contracting common in innovation? Is the fact that the contract does not 
specify all possible contingencies and action a case in contract incompleteness and bounded 
rationality, as contract theorists maintain (Hart 1988)?  Or, rather, can this type of contract find 
justification as a rational agreement, if the notion of contract and rationality are broadened with 
more serious consideration of innovation and discovery?  Is the broad category of ‘relational 
contracting’ (Macneil, 1978) sufficient to make sense of them? Are there significant differences 
between contracts for innovation and the most usually analyzed types of relational contract, 
based on stable long-term relations and repeated transactions?   
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The first part of the paper addresses these questions theoretically. The empirical study 
presented in the second part of the paper extracts evidence, pertinent to respond to those research 
questions, from a large database on the governance of projects in discovery- and design-intensive 
industries (the KGP database1). The results of the analyses square well with the governance 
patterns for innovation predicted by the broadened approach to rationality and contracts 
prospected here.  
 
The generative logic of innovation and discovery  
It has been already observed that when the world becomes more difficult to understand and 
predict, a possible move, especially if innovation is to be generated, is to treat uncertainty as an 
opportunity rather than a threat (Kirzner, 1979), to invest in research and to stretch the mind, 
rather than reducing the costs of search and cognitive effort (Grandori, 1984, 2010a); to apply 
forms of ‘rational imagination’ and design to generate possible alternatives, rather than 
remaining trapped in local search and in received problem frames (Byrne, 2005; Shackle, 1979; 
Le Masson, Hatchuel and Weil, 2007; Roberts, 2013).  
Outside economics and management – say, among philosophers of knowledge, logicians, 
engineers, designers, experts in the defense from natural hazards – no one seems to dispute that 
rational thinking in the face of the unknown is possible and indeed desirable; and this attitude has 
stimulated efforts to model how very complex open problems are solved through logically 
correct, methodologically rigorous procedures. Models of those processes are now available also 
in management fields that study innovation processes, including design theory, technological 
                                                 
1 The database was constructed in 2007 within the international research program ‘Knowledge, Governance and 
Projects’: a partnership among universities and investigators studying innovation and the project economy in 
countries with significant project-intensive sectors - Germany, Italy, Denmark in the EU, and California in USA, of 
which  the first author of this paper was the Principal Investigator. 
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innovation, entrepreneurship and strategic innovation. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give 
an account of all these procedures for effective innovative decision making. What we need and 
set out to do here is to identify some core common features of those methods for effective 
reasoning under uncertainty that have direct implications for contracting. These features can be 
summarized as follows.  
- The core ingredient of any logic of discovery is hypothesis formulation and testing (Popper, 
1935; Simon, 1976).  This holds for any science with an empirical basis, but also and more 
generally for any rigorous discovery and learning process in business and life (Campbell, 1991; 
Popper, 1989). Furthermore, this fundamental logics also governs processes where what is to be 
discovered are solutions that can be designed, and not something given and hidden in nature. For 
example, in strategy formulation, possible actions, possible scenarios, the diagnosis of trends or 
states of the world, conjectures about the possible moves of competitors etc, all have the logical 
status of hypotheses (Liedtka, 2000). In design theory, the core task is to validate propositions of 
the type  “There exists some object X, for which a group of properties p1,p2, pk hold in K” , 
where K is the body of existing knowledge, or knowledge space  (Le Masson, Hatchuel and 
Weil, 2007).  
- In innovative processes, problems are ‘open’ and not ‘given’. They have to be defined, and 
‘redefined’ in the very process of being solved (Pounds, 1969), through recursive processes 
(Hatchuel and Weil, 2003). The process of solving one problem may lead to solve another one 
(Campbell, 1960), and an ex-ante or prior problem definition may not even be needed, as when 
‘solutions’ or ‘means’ meet or even generate problems worth solving  (Cohen, March and Olsen, 
1976; Von Hippel and Van Krogh, 2016). 
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- Generating hypotheses on the multiple functions and consequences that an artifact, resource, or 
action may have is crucial in innovation processes.   “Design uses for one meter cotton thread” 
epitomizes a problem formulation for design purposes (LeMasson, Hatchuel and Weil, 2007); in 
other terms, the classic Simonian example of problem formulation -‘find a needle sharp enough 
to sew with’ – would become ‘design possible uses for a needle’. In fact, in the crafting of 
entrepreneurial opportunities as well as in the discovery and design of innovative products, a 
heuristic named ‘resources in search of uses’ (Henderson et al., 1999; Grandori, 2010a), or 
‘effectuation’ (Sarasvathy, 2008) has been repeatedly identified; meaning chiefly that the 
standard logic of solving a given problem (an end in search of means) can be usefully reversed 
for innovation purposes (means in search of ends, of problems to be solved). But even without 
the wider degrees of freedom provided by the possibility of designing alternatives, even when 
alternatives are not modifiable (e.g. when evaluating and choosing people or given technological 
equipment), basing their evaluation on multiple functions, and considering ‘unintended 
consequences’ is a core ingredient of innovative action selection (Villani et al., 2008).  
- As a result of all the above processes, in effective innovative decision making, knowledge 
‘expands’ (Hatchuel 2001; Hatchuel and Weil 2007), ‘problems shifts’ (Lakatos 1976), and 
hypotheses on objectives and cause-effect relations are revised (Grandori 1984).  
 
The associational and constitutional texture of contracts for innovation      
  If those are some core features of innovative rationality, we can now ask which features should 
a contract have in order to motivate and to allow the actors to engage in the ‘expanding’ and 
explorative decision processes that characterize discovery and design. If the logic of innovation 
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is characterized by the traits that were highlighted above, the expected traits of contracts for 
innovation, can be conjectured to comprise the following. 
  First, in order to provide room for the discovery of actions and objects what can be specified 
ex-ante is not a ‘description’ of such actions or objects.  For example, if an ‘unknown object’ is 
to be designed, that very object cannot be described before the design process ; rather it possible 
to hypothesize ‘only certain desirable properties, without the ability to give a constructive 
definition of the object and without being able to guarantee its existence on the basis of pre-
existing knowledge.” (Le Masson et al., 2017: 129). Furthermore, as illustrated above, 
innovation may also start not from problems to be solved or properties that a sought object 
should have, but from more open, ‘resources in search of uses’ questions like ‘which possible 
objects may be realized with a set of resources’, and ‘which properties may those objects have’ 
and ‘which problems  may they solve’. In those cases, in order to provide room for the discovery 
of consequences, the result parameters should  let be free to adjust (the possible ‘tunnel effect’ 
created by too narrow and specific targets in innovative activities has in fact been early detected 
in goal setting theory) (Locke, 1996). As in the Aspreva-La Roche agreement described in the 
Introduction, the ‘plan’ or ‘project’ is  defined as a general guideline and a broad domain of 
activity,  rather than as a detailed specification of a given problem to be solved, or type of 
activity to be performed or type of consequences to be reached.  
    What can the parties contract on, if outcomes, objectives and activities can be pre-defined only 
as hypotheses to be tested and revised? A fundamental shift in the matter of contracting is a 
possible response: agreeing on pooling and committing resources; rather than agreeing on actions 
or trans-actions (exchanges) is in itself a response to uncertainty (Grandori, 2010b). Parties can 
promise to commit resources, and bet on their potential rather than on specific actions, 
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transactions or projects. Examples range from R&D agreements, as the Aspreva-La Roche 
contract,  to ‘entrepreneurs/investors’ contracts for innovation, where ‘betting on the jockey’ (the 
resources) rather than ‘the horse’ (the project) is a very common decision strategy (Kaplan et al., 
2009). Early stage investors regularly and explicitly admit they know that the business plan 
presented is not likely to be the one that will be realized; and that the thing they value the most is 
the potential of human and technological resources to generate revised, adapted and novel 
projects (Grandori and Gaillard, 2011) 
    If parties commit resources without specifying their uses, it is critical that the contract 
specifies two other matters: which rights the parties have on the committed resources, and who 
decides on their use.  That’s why contracts for innovation, as in the Aspreva-La Roche case, are 
so focused on asset commitments, rights of ownership on those assets, residual rewards, decision 
and control rights, and separation procedures.  As an expert lawyer assisting contract writing in 
innovative activities in Silicon Valley said in one of our interviews: ‘When we come to the 
contract, there are many matters to specify - from sought outputs, to milestones, to warranties 
and indemnities, to decision and control rights, to exit procedures - but one thing is particularly 
important and completely specified: who owns what.”   
    In addition, if we wish to understand the texture of contracts under uncertainty, we should also 
consider that designing incentives and preventing conflicts are not the sole functions that 
contracts have in any relation of some complexity. Contracts are also tools for coordinating 
activities (Grandori, 1997; Gulati et al., 2005); hence their articulation is likely to be sensitive to 
the complexity and size of the activities to be coordinated. In fact, as documented in longitudinal 
studies of contract evolution (Mayer and Argyres, 2004), the process of learning from the errors 
and the problems encountered is likely to enrich the contract in all its components, including the 
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operational parts of agreements describing activities, as well as the procedures and mechanisms 
to be used in communication and the coordination of joint work.   
  In conclusion, the recourse to informal agreements and social norms, so dear to much literature 
on ‘relational contracting’, does not seem to be the whole story. Moreover, it is doubtful that it 
can cope with the substantial level of uncertainty and complexity that are characteristic of most 
innovation processes, both for reasons of conflict resolution and of activity coordination.  
In particular, if ‘relational contracts’ (RC) are intended as informal, i.e. as handshake 
agreements, they are weak in conflict resolution respects. They are flexible only because no 
formal commitment is taken. Hence, they are flexible at the expense of protection and 
enforceability (Shreyogg and Sydow, 2010), except for the restrictive case of self-enforceable 
agreements. And it is unlikely that self-enforceability obtains when innovative activities are 
involved (i.e., it is unlikely that the parties can clearly know ex-ante that the returns from 
collaboration outweigh those from opportunistic behavior). Hence, an exposure to considerable 
risk and opportunism is likely to follow. In fact, business companies rarely embark in projects 
entailing risks of this sort purely on the basis of trust, especially if the stakes are high; and even 
more so if the partner is ‘new’, as it may and should occur in innovation. Indeed, various 
influential students of inter-organizational contracting for innovation are increasingly skeptical 
that relational-as-informal contracting is up to the challenges posed by innovation and design 
(see, for example, Sabel and Zeitlin, 2004).   
 In their meaning of contracts embedded in socially enforceable norms, RC are more protective, 
thanks to social control, but at the expenses of flexibility. In fact, the establishment of social 
norms requires significant stability of partners and activities. However, social norms are quite 
difficult to change, due to the effects of interiorization, socialization, institutionalization and 
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group pressure   (Ouchi and Wilkins, 1983). If norms of conduct are limited to general principles 
they might be flexible in the sense of not constraining behavior excessively (i.e., they would 
leave room for adaptation), but that could be at the expense of clarity.  For example, establishing 
and verifying what constitutes “best effort”, “fair play” or “due diligence” in any given situation 
of some complexity is difficult not only for any court of law (Jennejohn, 2008), but even for the 
partners themselves (Grandori, 2006). In fact, when knowledge is differentiated and the parties 
change frequently over time (or are unfamiliar due to lack of long-standing relations), as it does 
and should occur in innovative projects, the cognitive bases for social control are weak.   
In sum, although informal agreements and social norms can be used in combination with formal 
contracting (Poppo and Zenger, 2002), both in repeated and stable exchange contracts (Brusco, 
1982) and in complex and innovative contracting (Gilson et al., 2010), they are unlikely to solve 
the main problems and hazards of contracting in the unknown. Our hypotheses stem from the 
suspicion that, together with the usually detected addition of social and informal governance, in 
effective governance of innovation other modifications occur in the structure of the formal 
contract, and that these have so far gone undetected for lack of pertinent theoretical lenses. 
 A  useful observation for  moving in that direction is  that the term ‘relational contracting’ has 
been used in yet another meaning, which has nothing to do with formalization. Rather, it has to 
do with the matter that is regulated: the relation among the parties, rather than the content of the 
actions and transactions that the parties must perform (Grandori, 2006). It is thanks to that basic 
shift that relational contracts in this sense have better properties than classic transactional 
contracts in the governance of uncertainty. Hence, in order to distinguish them from relational-
as- informal contracts (and to clarify their different cognitive underpinnings), it would be more 
precise and clear not to call them ‘relational’ but, paraphrasing Simon (1976), ‘procedural’ 
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contracts, in opposition to the traditional ‘substantive’ contracts. However, not all procedural 
contracts have the same properties. For example, a classic authority relation can be (and has 
been) seen as a relational contract in the sense that it substitutes a contract on what to do with a 
contract on who is going to decide what is to be done (Simon, 1951). Thanks to that property, the 
contracts and relations of authority can govern a higher degree of uncertainty – stemming from 
variability of conditions – than a market contract. Nevertheless, when uncertainty stems from 
knowledge rather than variability problems, as in innovation, then centralized decision making, 
hence also a contract incorporating it, is also expected to fail (Burns and Stalker, 1961; Perrow, 
1967; Nickerson and Zenger, 2004; Grandori, 2009).  
   Hence, the core question is: what kind of contract, in the course of focusing on the relation 
among parties, can also protect them from hazards, pool differentiated competences, and provide 
enough leeway for discovery, when activities are still largely unknown? 
    On the basis of the above discussion, we submit that rational contracting for the unknown 
should be characterized by each and all the following main features.  
     Contracts for innovation are ‘procedural’ (rather than ‘substantive’)   
A substantial part of the contractual provisions in any agreement of some complexity are 
‘procedural’ stipulations on ‘how to decide what to do’ rather than ‘substantive’ stipulations on 
what to do. In other words, parties can contract on the procedures for action selection and on the 
fair division procedures over (unknown) effects and consequences, deriving from the joint (not 
fully described) project. The higher the uncertainty, the more the procedural component can be 
expected to expand, relative to the substantive, action-specific component. 
     Contracts for innovation are ‘associational’ (rather than ‘transactional’)   
15 
 
  What can be also contracted on, that is reasonably known and clear, are the commitments of, 
and rights on, the resources that are supposed to generate a project of interest.  The rationale of 
such an associational, resource pooling feature of contracts for innovation is to take a step 
backward in the causal chain, to consider the factors or resources generating actions and 
consequences, and to contract on those factors, over rights and obligations over resources (in 
search of use) rather than over uses. For example, in the Aspreva-Roche case the core of the 
contract is the promise to commit resources to research, production and commercialization of 
still unknown products to be developed jointly. The contractual specification effort focuses on 
defining rights over the resources committed and over the outcomes, so that actions and 
transactions can be discovered along the way. In fact, the typical agreements that lie behind 
inter-firm alliances, joint ventures, consortia, etc. for innovation all rely on some form of 
associational contract (Grandori and Furlotti, 2006).  
    Contracts for innovation are ‘constitutional’ (rather than ‘operational’) 
  A necessary complementary ingredient for governing an association is to specify who will 
decide over the life of the association itself, over the stream of actions to be taken, and how. 
Contracts of association establish a sort of ‘condominium’ (Goldberg, 2013), endowed with “a 
sort of constitution regulating the on-going relationship” (Goldberg, 1976): we can “think of 
written parts of contractual relations as constitutions establishing legislative and administrative 
processes for the relation” (Macneil, 1978). Indeed, as in any condominium, a necessary 
complement of an agreement to associate is an agreement on who will decide and according to 
which procedures. The contracts (or the types of clauses within them) that associate partners, 
establish decision procedures (including separation) and apportion control and reward rights, can 
be called ‘constitutional’. The branch of economics broadly identified as ‘constitutional political 
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economy’ (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985; Vanberg, 1994)  borrowed the term ‘constitutional’ 
from the juridical tradition. Because of these foundational features, constitutional governance 
can especially be distinguished from and contrasted to ‘operational’ governance (Ostrom, 1990), 
which being more specific and applied in content, is the organizational governance equivalent of 
what ordinary law is within legal systems. 
Constitutional governance is usually operationalized as a set of (fundamental) rules.  However, 
constitutions do more than that. They are agreements or contracts (cum trahere means pulling 
together, after all) constituting actors and systems: “A constitution both recognises and 
reinforces the place of individual constituents within the institution, and also constitutes them as 
a group or collective” (Bottomley, 1997). 
Constitutional orders can also comprise unwritten, socially accepted, interiorized components 
(Sabel, 1993). However, we all know how important it is for legal certainty to have a ‘chart’ of 
written, explicit and enforceable constitutional provisions; and this is especially important in 
innovation as change and uncertainty are sources of hazards (Grandori and Furlotti, 2009).  
Constitutional governance for innovation is ‘poliarchic’ (rather than ‘hierarchic’) 
Constitutions may vary in their degree of centralization. At one extreme, a contract on 
decision rights may assign them all to a central actor, who is then entitled to choose the best 
actions as a function of circumstances. In spite of being able to cope with some uncertainty, 
though, such an agreement is effective for the system of action, and acceptable by the recipients 
of decisions, only under restrictive conditions, that are not those that typically characterize 
innovation. In fact, first and foremost, it is necessary that such a central actor holds the relevant 
knowledge for diagnosing circumstances and for selecting superior actions (Ostrom, 1990), and 
that the other agents are quasi-indifferent to the actions that can be prescribed to them (Simon, 
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1951). This is rarely the case in innovation. To generate novelty, most often it is necessary to 
‘recombine’ knowledge and competences, and these are likely to be held by different actors 
(Galunic and Rodan, 1998). These actors in turn, are rarely ‘quasi-indifferent’ on the use of their 
resources, and, even more importantly, they are more knowledgeable about the best possible uses 
(Grandori, 2016). Indeed, organizational research has established long ago that hierarchy is 
likely to ‘fail’ as a coordination mechanism in the governance of innovation (Burns and Stalker, 
1961). Therefore, centralized governance, even when based on a relational contract on decision 
rights as in authority relations, should not be expected to be an appropriate ingredient of 
contracts for innovation.  The alternative is a decentralized, multi-lateral allocation of decision 
rights, representative of all the constituencies (Ostrom, 1990; Bottomley, 1997); and it is this 
‘poliarchic’ rather than ‘hierarchic’ type of constitutional governance that can be argued to fit 
with highly uncertain, knowledge-intensive, innovative activities (Grandori, 2009).  
 
A study on project governance in design- and discovery-intensive industries 
Here we present original quantitative analyses of the KGP database pertinent to the above 
argument: 440 multi-party projects, in project intensive industries, in countries where all these 
sectors are well represented and accessible. The countries were Germany, Italy, Denmark and 
California (Silicon Valley) (see the Appendix for all the database characteristics).  
Projects were the units of analysis (one project-one questionnaire). Projects  are constituted by 
definition for performing non-routine activities, and are typically based on the pooling of 
different competences, but they can differ  in terms of design intensity and discovery intensity. 
The projects of the KGP database belong to three clusters of sectors that capture those 
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differences: creative industries, high technology and science-based sectors, and machinery and 
construction sectors.  
 Creative industries projects included ventures in advertising, architecture, design, film and 
video production, interactive leisure software, music, television and radio. Examples are a 
project for the production of television content, which involved one film producer, a TV 
broadcasting company and a film funding agency; or a project for live marketing events, that 
involved a live marketing agency, a company responsible for technical project management 
(light-show, sound, visual media) and a company in charge of artistic content. Creative industries 
are by definition design-intensive and are typically characterized by high uncertainty, due to both 
the volatility of tastes and demand, and the poor predictability and measurability of outputs 
(Caves, 2000).  
 High-technology and science-based projects are by definition discovery-intensive and 
research-intensive, and characterized by uncertainty in terms of expected output and the need to 
generate new knowledge in the process (Eisenhardt and Tabrizi, 1995; Fleming, 2001). Those in 
our sample were drawn from the semiconductors, software, biotechnology and 
telecommunication industries. Among the cases surveyed, for example, is a project between a 
large telecom operator, a provider of telecom equipment and a provider of software middleware, 
or collaborations between a designer of graphic chips and a chip manufacturer.  
Machinery and construction projects included industrial collaborations set up for the 
production of machine tools and the construction of industrial plants. Among the projects 
surveyed there were things such as the creation of an automated metallurgical plant, which 
brought together a rolling mill equipment developer, a supplier of power control systems, and a 
producer of furnaces for the steel industry; and the construction of a pipeline, which involved the 
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collaboration between an engineering contractor and steel tube producers. In projects of this 
cluster, variance may arise in the process, but the output is generally defined ex-ante and the 
techniques for implementing it are relatively known (Shenhar, 2001). Hence, the machinery and 
construction industries are used here for comparative purposes as a sector characterized by 
relatively better-known activities and technologies.  
The questionnaire included questions on the degree of innovativeness at the project level as 
well. The responses, as per the figures provided in Appendix, not only corroborate our 
expectations concerning the ranking by discovery intensity of the three sectors, but also indicate 
that a substantial number of our projects can be described as innovative. While the indicator is 
well-behaved in this respects, in terms of implications for contracting and governance, the 
differences in innovativeness at the project-level are likely to be augmented by and combined 
with sectoral uncertainty factors that are different across sectors, based on the different types of 
knowledge that are used therein (science-based, creative/cultural, applied technology). In 
addition, the output of innovative projects, especially the knowledge produced, spills widely 
beyond the borders of the focal projects (Elmquist and Le Masson, 2009), hence measuring 
innovativeness only at a project level may underestimate it. Therefore we used sectors as an 
independent variable. 
  As to governance, the questionnaires included questions on the extent to which various matters 
were specified in the contracts that regulated the collaboration among project partners. These 
matters were identified based on an initial list of around 20 items constructed through direct 
consultation with legal experts, content analysis of actual contracts and a review of empirical 
literature on contracts. Thereafter, conceptually similar aspects were grouped into a single class 
(for example, ownership of inputs and ownership of outputs are clustered into rights of 
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ownership; decision rights of various kinds were grouped etc.). Seven matters resulted: rights of 
ownership; decision and control rights; task descriptions; duration; separation procedures; 
warranties and indemnities; prices, fees and royalties. 
Given the common argument that governance in the face of the unknown becomes more 
informal, the same question was repeated, asking the extent to which informal mechanisms -
namely, informal agreements among parties or industry norms and customs - were used to 
govern the project on the same seven matters. 
The analysis of the data presented here shows that: a) the extent to which the seven matters 
are regulated by contracts is higher than the extent to which they are regulated by informal 
agreements and norms (Table 1) for all projects; b) contractual clauses do cluster around two 
factors: a ‘constitutional component’ that includes rights of ownership, decision rights and 
separation procedures, and an ‘operational component’ that includes price, task descriptions, and 
the duration  of  collaboration (Table 2) 2; and c) the ‘constitutional component’ of contracts is 
specified to a greater extent for projects in the more discovery- and design-intensive high-tech 
and creative sectors than in the machinery and construction sectors, net of various controls 
(Table 3). The three steps of the analysis and their results are reported in Table 1, 2 and 3 
respectively.  
 
(Insert Tables 1, 2 & 3 about here) 
 
Table 3 is to be read as follows. If a project is in the high-tech or creative sector cluster, 
ceteris paribus, the constitutional component in the contract is significantly more specified than 
                                                 
2 The loading of the ‘warranties and indemnities’ matter was almost the same on both factors. Due to this ambiguity, 
we dropped the item from subsequent analyses. 
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in projects in the Machinery and construction cluster, taken as a baseline of comparison. The 
richness of the constitutional component of contracts is not significantly explained by any other 
control variable, in particular project size and country of origin (columns 2). Rather, these other 
variables, which are not related to uncertainty, do affect the overall incidence of formal, 
contractual governance relative to informal governance (columns 6 and 8). Hence the results can 
be read as showing that the response to uncertainty is mainly a constitutionalization of 
governance, while the degree of formalization (i.e., the expression of governance by written 
contractual documents, rather than by informal means) responds to other factors. The effects of 
these other factors on formalization are unsurprising. Indeed, as mentioned in the hypotheses 
development part, contracts have also coordination functions and the number of activities to be 
coordinated is generally be expected to be positively related to the formalization of coordination 
mechanisms in organization theory. Furthermore, as known from societal effects studies, 
organization in some countries is ceteris paribus more formalized than in others, Germany 
amongst these, which our study is taken as the baseline country of comparison. In fact, the 
overall degree of contractual articulation and specification is negatively affected by the project 
being based in countries other than Germany (significantly so for the other countries that, being 
situated in Europe, and having similar civil law legal systems are more comparable with 
Germany). What is novel and surprising with respect to the classic tenets of organizational and 
contract theory, but consistent with our argument, is that knowledge-based uncertainty factors do 
not affect the degree of formalization, but the degree of constitutionalization of governance. 
Second, and interestingly, the effects of other factors commonly assumed to affect the intensity 
and articulation of contractual governance - such as the irreplaceability of partners and their prior 
ties3 - is muted (never significant in our sample). 
                                                 
3 These two variables were respectively measured as the number of alternative partners with whom the project at 
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These findings square well with those of a few other studies who performed analyses of 
contractual components. Luo (2002) has argued that the rigidity that may be engendered by 
contractual formalization can be avoided if contractual clauses are state-contingent  and/or refer 
to general principles, procedures and guidelines. His empirical analysis of a set of international 
joint-venture contracts showed that the scale items measuring the degree of specification of 
action obligations, and those measuring the degree of specification of contingent and procedural 
provisions, load on two different factors. Crocker and Masten (1991) distinguished the 
contribution to flexibility of contractually-stated procedures for automatically recalculating the 
terms of exchange as information becomes available (called ‘redetermination’ procedures) from 
the flexibility that is gained by contractually-stated rights and obligations to ad-hoc joint 
decision-making (called ‘renegotiation’ procedures). The authors also correlated the presence of 
these procedures with the type of uncertainty faced. Their empirical investigation of buyer-
supplier contracts in the natural gas industry found that the uncertainty that is engendered by 
price volatility did not increase the presence of renegotiation procedures, since such uncertainty 
can be managed by automatic redetermination procedures; while the task uncertainty stemming 
from long contract durations did.  
The KGP database also sheds light on whether the nature of the constitutional provisions tend to 
constitute a hierarchic or a poliarchic order. To that purpose, Table 4 (column 3) reports the 
average allocation, across the 440 contracts in the database, of broadly-intended property rights 
(on assets, residual decision and control, and outputs) to the three main partners of each project. 
                                                                                                                                                             
hand could have been carried out and the number of projects conducted in the past with the current partners. 
Convergent findings downplaying the role of asset specificity and prior joint activities have emerged in some other 
studies (Crocker and Masten, 1991; Reuer and Ariño, 2007) where these variables were measured through direct 
questions as in our study, rather than through ambiguous proxies such as investment size and the longevity of 
relations.  
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It also reports the contributions those partners made to the project, of various resources (columns 
1 and 2). The patterns that emerge indicate that key resources are diffused, and that project 
governance is diffused as well, with property rights assignments broadly proportional to the 
resources and capabilities contributed by each actor. Overall, this supports the thesis that when 
key resources are diffused, a governance that mirrors a representative democracy is in order, and 
that it is instituted and formalized in the constitutional part of the contract. 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
This paper argued that the intensification of innovation and the increase of knowledge 
intensity in the modern economy requires forms of rationality and governance that are different 
from those usually considered in economics and management. Drawing on various strands of 
study on innovation processes, the key form of reasoning behind innovation has been qualified as 
generative, hypothesis-testing and knowledge-expanding. Key traits and ingredients of that form 
of innovative rationality are methods such as:  treating all decision inputs as hypotheses to be 
generated and tested, letting problems to shift and actions to change, leveraging on the 
multifunctionality of actions and resources, and defining multiple objectives that can be flexibly 
adjusted to circumstances and opportunities. On that basis, the core question addressed has been 
to clarify which forms of governance, intended especially as forms of contracting, can permit and 
sustain those discovery processes, by providing adequate cognitive space as well as incentives to 
invest resources in its exploration. 
Contracts with those capacities of governing innovation have been hypothesized to be 
characterized by four key features: contracts for innovation are procedural (rather than 
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substantive); associational (rather than transactional); constitutional (rather than operational); 
and poliarchic (rather than hierarchic).  
   The hypothesis that, as the discovery and design intensity of the governed activities increases, 
the constitutional component in contracts grows, and that the type of constitution is that of a 
multi-lateral representative association, has been also supported by an original specific 
quantitative analysis on a large questionnaire data base (the Knowledge, Governance and 
Projects database) on contracts governing projects in design- and discovery-intensive industries.  
 The elaborations on the KGP database conducted for this paper may illuminate some further 
aspects of interest in the management of innovation. In particular, the database includes both 
design-intensive creative projects and discovery-intensive science-based projects, allowing to 
explore whether the two different types of innovation processes might call for different 
governance configurations. Interestingly, they do not. The similarity of contractual profiles in the 
two contexts   is consistent with the idea that the logic of discovery (likely to prevail in science-
based projects) and the logic of design (likely to characterize projects in creative industries) are 
similar enough for being supported and governed  by the same  type of contractual arrangement.   
Finally, the notion of constitutional contracting enriches the theoretical debate in both 
organization theory and organizational economics.  
First, it suggests some revisions of the common tenets on formalization and contracts in 
organization theory. Constitutional contracts and agreements provide a ‘flexible formalization’ 
solution (Grandori, 2006) to the management of innovation, while flexibility and formalization 
are traditionally seen as conflicting dimensions (Schreyögg and Sydow, 2010; Volberda, 1998).  
With respect to organizational economics, the analysis conducted in the paper contributes in 
several other ways. First and foremost, it has been argued and shown that formal contracts do not 
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‘fail’ altogether under the conditions of strong uncertainty that characterize innovation; and that 
they are not simply sustained by complementary informal agreements and norms. Rather, the 
formal and enforceable contract itself changes structure, by incorporating a stronger 
constitutional component, so that parties are free to discover new actions but are at the same time 
protected from hazards. Furthermore, it has been argued and shown that in innovative activities, 
such constitutional agreements should constitute partners and allocate property and decision 
rights in a poliarchic and representative way, rather than in a hierarchic way. On this ground, the 
argument is consistent with established propositions about the internal governance and 
organizational structures for innovation, such as that the governance of innovative firms is 
typically based on a multi-lateral agreement among investors of different types of capital 
(human, technical, financial) (Grandori and Gaillard, 2011) and  on a ‘democratization’ of 
residual decision and reward rights (Rajan and Zingales, 2000); and that their internal 
organization is decentralized, ‘intrapreneurial’ and even democratic rather than hierarchic (e.g. 
Miles et al., 1997). 
A  more general conceptual implication therefore is that it would be helpful to abandon 
oppositions that, at a closer scrutiny, seem ill-founded: in particular, the opposition between 
contracts on one side (seen as mechanisms more pertinent to markets) and other governance 
mechanisms (seen as mechanisms more pertinent to organizations), such  as  authority relations 
and constitutions. Contracts can regulate transactions, but can also pool resources and constitute 
organizations; and even the foundation of a firm can be seen as a  particularly intense, entity 
establishing, form of constitutional contracting (Grandori 2010b). 
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Appendix - The KGP database 
The data derive from countries with a significant presence of project-intensive industries, 
namely, Germany, Italy, and Denmark in Europe and Silicon Valley California in the US. They 
were collected in 2007, within the international research program ‘Knowledge, Governance and 
Projects’, a research partnership among five universities in different European countries of which 
one of the authors of this paper was the principal investigator. The following prospect 
summarizes the main features of the database. 
 
Industry groupings Sampling frame 
 
Creative  
Events (fairs, exhibitions, congresses; operation of art 
facilities) 
Motion pictures 
Business-to-business design 
Games 
Advertising 
Publishing 
Recorded music 
 
Denmark: Registered enterprises within NACE/DB03 
industry codes 221110, 365000, 744010, 744090, 
921100, 923110, 923200 
Germany: List obtained from various industry 
associations (Federal Association of German Galleries, 
the Association of Concert Agencies, etc.), industry 
rankings (e.g., Werben & Verkaufen ranking of major 
advertising companies) and prior academic research 
(e.g., DFG-Project “Production in Projects” - Bonn 
University) 
 
 
High-tech  
Semiconductors 
Computer/Communication hardware 
Innovation services 
Biomedical 
Electronic components 
Software consultancy and supply 
 
Denmark: Registered enterprises within NACE/DB03 
industry codes 722100 and 722200 
Germany: List from prior academic research project 
(DFG-Project “Production in Projects” - Bonn 
University) 
California: List of firms from the Silicon Valley 
Venture Capitalists Association 
 
 
Machinery and construction 
Machinery and equipment 
Mechanical engineering  
Industrial plant construction  
  
  
 
Germany: List of member firms of the German 
Engineering Federation 
Italy: List of member firms of the following industry 
associations: ANIMP, OICE, UCIMU, APRI, AIAD, 
UCIMA, UCOMESA 
  
Conceptual reasoning and the insights of scholars familiar with these three industries suggest that 
projects in creative and high-tech industries are typically more discovery-intensive than those in 
the machinery sector, and various indicators and data also support this view. For example, the 
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2010 European Community Innovation Survey (CIS) of German firms reports the following 
figures for those industries in the CIS that most closely approximate the high-tech (HT), creative 
(C) and machinery sectors (M) of our study: 4 
 The percentage of enterprises in which a majority of employees hold a university degree is 
42, 15, and 3 in HT, C and M respectively. 
 The percentage of enterprises with innovation activities of sorts is 97, 89, and 88 in HT, C 
and M respectively. 
 The turnover from novel products is 42, 47, and 37 percent of total sector turnover in HT, C 
and M respectively. 
 The percentage of enterprises that engage in organizational and marketing innovation is 73, 
80, and 66 percent of the total number of enterprises in HT, C and M respectively. 
 The percentage of enterprises engaging in technological innovation and in continuous R&D 
efforts (data available and appropriate for high-tech and machinery sectors only) are 
respectively 94 in HT and 84 in M, and 69 in HT and 41 in M. 
This assessment is also supported by project-level figures from our sample: 
 
Industry % Projects that develop 
novel products/services* 
HighTech 44.34 
Creative 39.00 
Engineering & Construction 35.04 
* Novel to the partners, the industry or the world as opposed to the 
product/service being a variation or a new generation of an existing 
product/service. Sample averages. N= 440. 
 
These figures not only corroborate our expectations concerning the ranking by discovery 
intensity of the three sectors, but also indicate that a substantial number of our projects can be 
described as innovative. However, when added to the model, the project-level indicator does not 
affect the other coefficients and has no significant effect of its own, probably, as discussed in the 
text, for their combination with wider industry uncertainty. Since its inclusion also reduces the 
model fit, we opted for a more parsimonious model specification (data available from the 
authors)’ 
                                                 
4 Details about the data, the method and the results of these analyses are available from the authors. 
36 
 
Although our data were collected through a questionnaire survey, it is important to notice that 
five of the explanatory variables in the dependence analyses we perform (the sector dummies, 
and the country dummies) are not self-reported, but are known from the sampling framework. 
Therefore, percept-percept inflation is not an issue with them. To address the possibility that 
common methods bias may influence the estimates of the remaining parameters, we used 
Harman’s (Harman, 1967) single-factor test to assess whether a significant amount of common 
variance exists in the data (Podsakoff et al., 2003). All questionnaire items of contractual and 
informal governance variables, along with the items of the control variables were entered in a 
factor analysis. Using the eigenvalue-greater-than-one criterion revealed five factors, the first of 
which explained only 24.0 percent of the variance in the data, indicating that the findings cannot 
be attributed to common methods bias. 
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Table 1. Intensity of regulation through contracts and informal mechanisms by matter 
 
  
Table 2. Factor analysis of contractual clauses 
Matters Operational 
governance 
(Factor 1) 
Constitutional 
governance 
(Factor 2) 
Uniqueness 
Rights of ownership -0.14 0.90 0.27 
Decision and control rights 0.10 0.76 0.35 
Separation procedures 0.37 0.55 0.39 
Tasks 0.82 -0.03 0.34 
Duration 0.90 -0.09 0.24 
Prices, fees and royalties 0.66 0.16 0.46 
    
Eigenvalue 2.91 1.04  
Variance explained (%) 0.48 0.17  
Cumulative (%) 0.48 0.66  
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Table 3. The constitutionalization of governance in design- and discovery-intensive sectors 
 Contractual governance  Ratio Contractual/Informal governance 
 Constitutional Operational  Constitutional Operational 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Creative  0.479***  -0.091   0.418**  0.141 
  (0.125)  (0.111)   (0.144)  (0.141) 
High tech  0.430**  -0.109   0.446**  0.238 
  (0.136)  (0.119)   (0.154)  (0.170) 
          
Irreplaceability 0.014 -0.009 0.002 0.008  0.009 -0.015 0.012 -0.001 
 (0.053) (0.052) (0.047) (0.049)  (0.058) (0.056) (0.059) (0.060) 
Prior joint projects -0.042 -0.051 -0.042 -0.040  0.001 -0.007 0.006 0.002 
 (0.041) (0.040) (0.030) (0.030)  (0.045) (0.044) (0.046) (0.046) 
Project size 0.182*** 0.232*** 0.163*** 0.153***  0.249*** 0.293*** 0.219*** 0.235*** 
 (0.041) (0.043) (0.035) (0.038)  (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.050) 
Project duration -0.090 -0.045 -0.060 -0.066  -0.030 0.003 -0.061 -0.056 
 (0.099) (0.098) (0.104) (0.105)  (0.093) (0.094) (0.107) (0.107) 
          
Denmark -0.172 -0.329** -0.294** -0.256*  -0.123 -0.281* -0.010 -0.090 
 (0.119) (0.121) (0.110) (0.116)  (0.124) (0.127) (0.130) (0.139) 
Italy -0.377*** -0.246* -0.164+ -0.190*  -0.197 -0.081 0.074 0.115 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.086) (0.089)  (0.125) (0.133) (0.130) (0.138) 
Silicon Valley 0.134 -0.050 -0.208 -0.148  -0.032 -0.258 -0.028 -0.185 
 (0.129) (0.176) (0.146) (0.181)  (0.145) (0.193) (0.175) (0.230) 
Constant 1.714*** 1.229*** 2.266*** 2.353***  0.301 -0.109 0.639+ 0.518 
 (0.308) (0.332) (0.286) (0.309)  (0.344) (0.367) (0.336) (0.373) 
Observations 440 440 440 440  440 440 440 440 
R-squared 0.082 0.117 0.104 0.106  0.101 0.126 0.068 0.073 
F 5.887*** 7.876*** 7.974*** 6.269***  5.853*** 6.332*** 4.116*** 3.571*** 
Notes: + 0.10; * 0.05; ** 0.01; *** 0.001 (two-sided tests). Specification: OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables for the models: (1) 
and (2): degree of specification of constitutional matters in contracts; (3) and (4): degree of specification of operational matters in contracts; (5) and (6) extent to 
which constitutional matters are regulated through contractual specifications relative to informal agreements and norm specifications; (7) and (8): extent to which 
operational matters are regulated through contractual specifications relative to informal agreements and norm specifications. 
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Table 4. Representative multi-lateral governance: resources committed to the project and 
property rights held by key partners   
 
 Resource contributions  Property Rights 
Assigned 
(Average %) Technological 
and Financial 
Human and 
Social 
  
 (1)  (2)   (3) 
Partner 1 47.7 55  56.1 
Partner 2 31.5 27.3  26.8 
Partner 3 20.7 17.5  13.3 
TOTAL 99.9 99.8  96.2 
          Notes: Cell content: sample means (percentage). N= 440.  
 
